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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CRAIG BURR AND LOWELL CLARK, ) BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
) CRAIG BURR AND LOWELL CLARK 
Petitioners, ) 
vs. ) 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ) 
CORRECTIONS and THE CAREER ) 
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD, of ) 
the State of Utah, ) 
Respondent/Agencies. ) 
) Case No. 20040162 CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, 
APPEAL FROM THE 
CRAIG 
CAREER 
BURR ANE 
SERVICE 
) LOWELL 
REVIEW : 
CLARK 
BOARD 
I. 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2) (a) confers jurisdiction 
upon the Court of Appeals to review cases involving the 
appeal from the final orders from formal adjudication 
proceedings of state agencies. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Career Service Review Board 
("CSRB") violate the "whole record" test by improperly 
"correcting" the Step 5 Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact 
when the Finding in question involves credibility issues? 
This issue was preserved below at R.564-565. 
Standard of Review: This issue is one of general 
law and is to be analyzed for correctness with no deference 
given to the trial court's decision. Zissi v. State Tax 
Comm'n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992); Morton Int'l v. 
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1991); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 
23, 27 (Utah App.Ct. 1991). 
2. Did the CSRB err by making a new Finding of Fact 
that is unsupported by the record and thereafter improperly 
engaging in speculation as to the Department of Corrections' 
purported justification(s) for inequitably compensating Burr 
and Clark? This issue was preserved below at R.565. 
Standard of Review This issue is one of general 
law and is to be analyzed for correctness with no deference 
given to the trial court's decision. Zissi v. State Tax 
Comm'n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992); Morton Int'l v. 
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1991); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 
2 
23, 27 (Utah App.Ct. 1991). 
3. Did the CSRB err by failing to determine that Pete 
Haun, Executive Director of the Utah Department of 
Corrections acted contrary to the agency's prior practice 
and/or arbitrarily and capriciously, by refusing to grant 
Petitioners Craig Burr and Lowell Clark (uBurr and Clark") 
their requested remedy of four (4) Step salary increase when 
E.D. Haun had previously granted pay increases to other 
employees of the Utah Department of Corrections to correct 
pay inequities? This issue was preserved below at R.4 68-
473. 
Standard of Review: The issue of the application of 
statutes to the facts at bar is one of general law and is to 
be analyzed for correctness with no deference given to the 
trial court's decision below. The issue regarding whether 
E.D. Haun's decision violated prior practice or was 
otherwise arbitrary and capricious, is initially reviewed 
for correctness but the burden is then shifted to the Utah 
Department of Corrections to justify its departure from its 
prior practice on the basis of reasonableness and 
3 
rationality. Taylor v. Dep't of Commerce, 952 P.2d 1090 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 
818 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). 
4. Did the CSRB err by determining that the 
Department of Resource Management ("DHRM") has sole 
responsibility for remedying pay inequities? This issue was 
preserved below at R.466-468. 
Standard of Review: This issue is one of general 
law and is to be analyzed for correctness with no deference 
given to the trial court's decision. Zissi v. State Tax 
Comm7n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992); Morton Int'l v. 
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1991); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 
23, 27 (Utah App.Ct. 1991). 
5. Did the CSRB err by determining that career 
service employees are not entitled to equitable application 
of their salary range under the statutory framework 
requiring "equal pay for equal work" (U.C.A. 67-19-
12(3)(a)), "equitable application" of salary ranges (67-19-
12(3) (b)) , and "equitable and competitive compensation" (67-
4 
19-3.1(1)(b))? This issue was preserved below at R.460-462. 
Standard of Review: This issue is one of general 
law and is to be analyzed for correctness with no deference 
given to the trial court's decision. Zissi v. State Tax 
Comm'n of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992); Morton Int'l v. 
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1991); Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 
23, 27 (Utah App.Ct. 1991). 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS/ 
STATUES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are applicable to the 
case on appeal and each of the following are set forth in 
the text of the Argument hereinafter (pursuant to Rule 24(f) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure): 
1. Constitutional provisions: N/A. 
2. Statutes: 
a. U.C.A. 63-46b-16(4) (h) (1988) . 
M4) The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, 
it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
5 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency7 s prior 
practice, unless the agency 
justifies the inconsistency by 
giving facts and reason that 
demonstrate a fair and rational 
basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious." 
U.C.A. 63-46(b)-16 (4) (h) (1988) . 
(Emphasis supplied). 
U.C.A. 67-19-3.1(1) (b) (2000) : 
"67-19-3.1. Principles governing 
interpretation of chapter and adoption of 
rules. 
(1) The department shall establish a career 
service system designed in a manner that will 
provide for the effective implementation of 
the following merit principles: 
(b) providing for equitable and competitive 
compensation." Utah Code Annotated 67-19-
3.1(1) (b) (2000) . (Emphasis supplied) . 
U.C.A. 67-19-12(3)(a)(1997): 
xv(3) (a) The director shall prepare, maintain, 
and revise a position classification plan for 
each employee position not exempted under 
Subsection (2) to provide equal pay for equal 
work." Utah Code Annotated 67-19-
12(3) (a) (1997) (Emphasis supplied) . 
U.C.A. 67-19-12(3)(b)(1997): 
M3)(b) Classification of positions shall be 
z 
based upon similarity of duties performed and 
responsibilities assumed, so that the same job 
requirements and the same salary range may be 
applied equitably to each position in the same 
class." (Emphasis supplied). 
3. Administrative Rules: 
a. CSRB Rule 137-1-21(3) (2003) : 
xx(3) Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing. An 
evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new 
hearing for the record according to 
Subsections 67-19a-406 (1) and (2), held de 
novo, with both parties being granted full 
administrative process as follows: 
(a) The CSRB hearing officer shall first 
make factual findings based solely on the 
evidence presented at the hearing without 
deference to any prior factual findings of the 
agency. The CSRB hearing officer shall then 
determine whether: 
(i) the factual findings made from 
the evidentiary/step 5 hearing support 
with substantial evidence the allegations 
made by the agency or the appointing 
authority, and 
(ii) the agency has correctly 
applied relevant policies, rules, and 
statutes. 
(b) When the CSRB hearing officer 
determines in accordance with the procedures 
set forth above that the evidentiary/step 5 
factual findings support the allegations of 
the agency or the appointing authority, then 
the CSRB hearing officer must determine 
whether the agency's decision, including any 
disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive, 
disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an 
7 
abuse of discretion. In making this latter 
determination, the CSRB hearing officer shall 
give deference to the decision of the agency 
or the appointing authority unless the 
agency's penalty is determined to be 
excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an 
abuse of discretion in which instance the CSRB 
hearing officer shall determine the 
appropriate remedy. 
b. CSRB Rule 137-1-22 (4) (a) (2003) : 
(4) The Board's Standards of Review. The 
board's standards of review based upon the 
following criteria: 
(a) The board shall first make a determination 
whether the factual findings of the CSRB 
hearing officer are reasonable and rational 
according to the substantial evidence standard. 
When the board determines that the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not 
reasonable and rational based on the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the 
board may, in its discretion, correct the 
factual findings, and also make new or 
additional factual findings." 
c. DHRM Rule 477-7-4 (11) (c) (iii) (2000) : 
(11) Administrative Salary Increase. 
The executive director or commissioner 
authorizes and approves Administrative 
Salary increases under the following 
parameters: 
(c) Justifications for Administrative 
Salary Increases shall be: 
(iii) Supported by issues such as: 
special agency conditions or problems, 
8 
equity issues, or other unique situations 
or considerations in the agency." 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. CASE NATURE, COURSE, PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
Petitioner's Craig Burr and Lowell Clark (herein "Burr 
and Clark") filed their grievance requesting a four step pay 
increase based on their pay inequity on May 28, 1998. R.l. 
Then Executive Director Pete Haun denied Burr and Clark's 
grievance on July 18, 2 000. R.3 9-40. Burr and Clark timely 
advanced their grievance to the Career Service Review Board 
on or about August 11, 2000. R.41-42. 
Hearing Officer J. Francis Valerga (herein H.O. 
Valerga) conducted the Step 5 hearing on August 14 and 15, 
2002. R.231-232. On December 13, 2002, H.O. Valerga issued 
his "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order" denying 
Burk and Clark's requested relief. R.3 97. On December 19, 
2002, Burr and Clark timely appealed to the Step 6 level -
the Career Service Review Board. R.431. 
After briefing and oral argument, the Career Service 
Review Board entered its order styled "Decision and Final 
Agency Action" on December 22, 2003, upholding H.O. 
9 
Valerga's decision denying Burr and Clark's requested 
relief. R.413. On January 12, 2004, Burr and Clark's 
timely filed their Motion for Reconsideration and Supporting 
Memorandum. R.564. On January 28, 2 0 04, the CSRB denied 
Burr and Clark's Motion for Reconsideration in its order 
styled "Denial of Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration of 
the Step 6 Decision and Final Agency Action Dated December 
22, 2003." R.583. 
Burr and Clark timely filed with this Court their 
Petition for Review of Final Administrative Agency Decision 
on February 25, 2 0 04. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Captains Burr and Clark are, and were, career service 
employees at the time of filing their grievance on or about 
May 28, 1998. Burr and Clark are presently employed by the 
Utah Department of Corrections.1 They are both assigned to 
the Gunnison Prison. R.231 (Transcript p.103, 125). Burr 
and Clark have requested a four-step pay increase in order 
1. During the appeal process, effective January 3, 2 0 04, 
Petitioner Burr was promoted from Captain to Deputy Warden. 
Said promotion does not materially or adversely impact the 
issues at bar but illustrates he is an excellent employee. 
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to compensate them in a manner consistent with other 
employees occupying the same position but who have equal or 
less education and/or experience. R.l, R.6, R.231 
(Transcript p.109-111). 
Burr and Clark have more education and/or experience 
than fellow Captains William Carlson ("Carlson") and Randall 
Kevin Harr ("Harr") but receive substantially less 
compensation per hour.2 R.231 (Transcript p.104, 109-110, 
128- 130), R.276 (Grievant's Exhibit 12), a copy of the 
relevant transcript pages is highlighted and included in the 
Addendum as a part of Exhibit A. For example, as of April, 
2. Burr and Clark earn between $1.93 and $4.33 less per 
hour than other individuals within UDOC who occupy the same 
classification, but who have less experience and/or 
education. Captain Burr has a Bachelor of Science in 
Business Management from BYU, has been with UDOC since 
September 4, 1990, and has been a Captain since April of 
1992. Captain Clark was hired by UDOC on September 2, 1983, 
and has been a captain since June of 1993. In their 
Grievance, Burr and Clark compared themselves to fellow 
Captains Carlson and Captain Harr. Carlson was hired after 
Burr and Clark on October 28, 1991, and made captain after 
Burr and Clark on September 19, 1993. Although Harr was 
hired before Burr (but not Clark) on June 18, 1990, he made 
captain after Burr and Clark in September of 1993. Neither 
Carlson nor Harr have any educational background or work 
experience that would potentially justify their higher 
compensation levels. R.231 (Transcript p.104, 109, 128-
130), R.276 (Grievant's Exhibit 12). 
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2 001, Carlson received $2.3 7 more per hour than Burr and 
Harr received $4,33 more per hour than Burr. Similarly, 
Carlson received $2.92 more per hour than Clark. R.276 
(Grievant's Exhibit 12). Accordingly, Burr and Clark 
submitted a "pay inequity" grievance alleging that the Utah 
Department of Corrections (the xvUDOC") had inequitably 
applied the Captain salary range as demonstrated by the 
substantial differing rates of pay.3 
IV. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: Burr and Clark disputed Hearing Officer J. 
Francis Valerga's Finding of Fact No. 2 9 from the CSRB. 
R.45 9. Finding of Fact No. 2 9 found that: 
xv29. Notwithstanding the fact that different 
positions, hire dates, budgets, freeze years, 
performance evaluations, and career paths 
3. It cannot be readily disputed that Carlson and Harr are 
proper comparables because the three positions styled 
Support Service Supervisor (USSIII") Correctional 
Institutional Program Coordinator ("IPC") and Captain are 
interchangeable and have been so treated at the 
administrative convenience by UDOC. R.231 (Transcript p.28, 
29, 47-48, 51). All three positions have the same salary 
range, are bench marked to the same job classification and 
are all on the same level of the UDOC organizational chart. 
R.231 (Transcript p.26, 69), R.246-248. 
i? 
might potentially account for the differences 
in pay between Grievant Burr, Grievant Clark, 
Mr. Carlson and Mr. Harr, no specific reasons 
were identified for the differences in pay." 
R.400. 
Burr and Clark marshaled the evidence below and 
Respondents did not claim that marshalling to be 
insufficient nor did the UDOC dispute Burr and Clark's 
arguments but rather merely asserted that Finding of Fact 
No. 29 was appropriate. R.459, R.526-527. The CSRB 
"corrected" Finding of Fact No. 29 but did not rely on the 
whole record when it corrected the same. R.425-426. Burr 
and Clark challenged Finding of Fact No. 29 on the basis 
that the only evidence UDOC offered as to the cause of the 
difference in pay was as to Carlson an Administrative Salary 
Increase (ASI) on March 24, 1994. R.459-460. This evidence 
was insufficient to rebut Burr and Clark's demonstration of 
substantial difference in pay between Burr and Clark and 
Messrs. Carlson and Harr. Burr and Clark satisfied their 
burden to prove that a pay difference existed and then the 
burden shifted to Respondent to demonstrate a justifiable 
reason to support the pay difference. However, UDOC failed 
to meet its burden, therefore Burr and Clark prevailed on 
their pay inequity claim. 
n *3 
POINT II; The CSRB, sub silentio, improperly engaged 
in speculation and made a finding of fact in violation of 
the residuum rule. At page 14 of the CSRB's Decision, the 
CSRB cites "factors" from its Patel decision and then 
"finds" those factors were present in this case. R.42 6. In 
doing so, the CSRB explicitly relies on its interpretation 
of two (2) exhibits that is wholly unsupported by the record 
testimony. The CSRB's Decision is thus a violation of the 
residuum rule and is improperly based on speculation. 
POINT III: Executive Director Pete Haun's (E.D. Haun) 
denial of Burr and Clark's request for an Administrative 
Salary Increase (UASI") was arbitrary and capricious. The 
UDOC had a practice of granting ASI's to remedy internal and 
external pay inequities. R.231 (Transcript p.32), R.232 
(Transcript p.215-216). In fact, at the time Burr and 
Clark's grievance was denied by E.D. Haun, he simultaneously 
granted a fellow employee an ASI in the amount of seven (7) 
steps to remedy a "pay inequity." R.231 (Transcript p.BB-
SS, 88-89) a copy of the relevant transcript pages is 
highlighted and included in the Addendum as a part of 
Exhibit A. E.D. Haun's denial was based on the claim that 
Burr and Clark had not provided valid comparables and thus 
failed to establish that a pay inequity existed. R.288-289 
(Agency Exhibit 1). E.D. Haun's reasoning is flawed for two 
(2) reasons. First, he failed to compare Burr to Carlson, 
despite admitting they were proper comparables. Second, he 
improperly excluded individuals in the IPC and SSIII 
positions (i.e. Harr) from the comparison analysis. Burr and 
Clark unequivocally demonstrated, and the CSRB so found, 
that the positions of IPC, SSIII and Captain are 
interchangeable and Messrs. Carlson and Harr were, in fact, 
valid comparables. R.424 (fn.16). 
POINT IV: The CSRB improperly interpreted the 
statutory mandates of equal pay for equal work, equitable 
application of salary range, and equitable and competitive 
compensation as being within the sole purview of DHRM to 
correct. The UDOC has the ability and responsibility to 
correct pay inequities vis-a-vis Burr and Clark and Carlson 
and Harr as demonstrated by the seven step ASI given to Burr 
and Clark's fellow employees. Furthermore, E.D. Chabries 
testified that the UDOC's Administrative Law Judge Spencer 
Robinson initially requested a declaratory order from DHRM's 
E.D. Karen Suzuki-Okabe, as to DHRM's interpretation 
regarding this case, but later withdrew the request. R.232 
15 
(Transcript p.229-231). E.D. Chabries further testified 
that the issue was to be addressed by him as the Executive 
Director of the UDOC and not DHRM. R.232 (Transcript p. 22 9-
231). Apparently, the UDOC has admitted that it was its 
responsibility to address the pay inequity issue. Further, 
the UDOC is responsible for creating the pay inequity and 
should accordingly be held responsible. 
POINT V: Three (3) Utah statutes provide Burr and 
Clark their requested relief: U.C.A. 67-19-12(3)(a) "equal 
pay for equal work"; U.C.A. 67-19-12(3) (b) "equitable 
application of their salary range"; and, U.C.A. 67-19-
3.1(1) (b) "equitable and competitive compensation." Burr 
and Clark proved that they are in the same classification 
(IPC, SSIII and Captain as the same classification), 
however, they are paid substantially less then Messrs. 
Carlson and Harr who have less education and/or experience 
in the Captain level position. The CSRB improperly frames 
Burr and Clark's request as requesting the same/identical 
salary and incorrectly interprets the applicable statutes as 
providing only a right to the same salary range. R.422-423. 
However, the statutes clearly contemplate equitable 
application of their salary range. Burr and Clark have the 
same salary range with Messrs. Carlson and Harr, however, 
the salary range is not being equitably applied because 
Messrs. Carlson and Harr have less education and/or 
experience, but are being paid substantially more, without 
justification. R.231 (Transcript p.26, 69, 104, 109, 128-
130), R.246-248, R.276 (Grievant's Exhibit 2). 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE CSRB'S DECISION VIOLATES THE WHOLE RECORD 
TEST BY IMPROPERLY "CORRECTING" FINDING NO. 29 
The CSRB violated the "whole record" test mandated by 
its own rule, R137-l-22(4) (a) (2003), and applicable caselaw, 
by '"correcting" the Step 5 Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact 
Number 29. CSRB Rule 137-1-22(4) (a) (2003),4 requires the 
CSRB to examine the uwhole record" when reviewing the 
4. "(4) The Board's Standards of Review. The board's 
standards of review based upon the following criteria: 
(a) The board shall first make a determination of 
whether the factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are 
reasonable and rational according to the substantial 
evidence standard. When the board determines that the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not 
reasonable and rational based on the evidentiary/step 5 
record as a whole, then the board may, in its discretion, 
correct the factual findings, and also make new or 
additional factual findings." R137-1-22 (4) (a) . (Emphasis 
supplied). 
17 
Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision.5 Specifically, the CSRB 
erroneously attempts to, sua sponte, "correct" Hearing 
Officer Valerga's (herein uH.O. Valerga") Finding of Fact 
No. 29* by finding that Mr. Carlson's pay increase in March 
of 19 94 occurred because Mr. Carlson "temporarily assum[ed] 
responsibilities of a higher level position."7 See, the 
CSRB's Decision at pages 13-14 and footnote 20 therein.8 In 
5. See, also, Grace Drilling Co v. Board of Review, 776 
P.2d 63, 68 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). 
6. H.O. Valerga's Finding of Fact No. 29: 
xx29. Notwithstanding the fact that different 
positions, hire dates, budgets, freeze years, 
performance evaluations, and career paths might 
potentially account for the differences in pay 
between Grievant Burr, Grievant Clark, Mr. Carlson 
and Mr. Harr, no specific reasons were identified 
for the differences in pay." R.400. 
7. Also adding implausibility to finding that Mr. Harr's 
ASI of $1.50 was justified based on his temporarily assuming 
additional responsibilities one would logically expect the 
pay increase to also be temporary. 
8. It is rather obvious that the CSRB's intent in "finding" 
a purported "justification" for the pay discrepancy between 
Burr and Clark and Mr. Carlson is a less than subtle attempt 
to make the case at bar "fit" within the CSRB's reading of 
its prior decision in C.C. Patel v. Div. of Env. Health, 4 
CSRB 37 (1991). The CSRB's efforts are troublesome, however, 
for three (3) reasons: First, UDOC did not rely on Ms. 
Haymond's testimony at Transcript pages 207-210 (R.232 
Transcript p. 207-210) in its Step 6 Brief that the CSRB now 
the process of "correcting" H.O. Valerga's Finding, the 
CSRB's Decision cites to only a portion of the transcript 
(i.e., R.232 Transcript p.207-208) which is the only 
evidence on the record that supports its decision. Ms. Kay 
Haymond testified regarding her review of Mr. Carlson's 
personnel file during a recess in the proceedings that Mr. 
Carlson received a special adjustment on March 29, 1994: 
"A. [Ms. Haymond] It referred to his acting 
in a temporary capacity at a higher level, and 
he was awarded an increase for that. 
Q. [Mr. Nolan] And what significance does 
that have in your judgment? 
A. In my judgment it just shows one more 
Instance that can affect a person's pay range 
or pay rate over a career. 
Q. Because assuming some additional 
responsibility or other assignment at the 
request of management presumably? 
A. Correct." R.232 (Transcript p. 207-208). 
utilizes to underpin its '"corrected" finding and the CSRB 
thus appears to be "searching" for evidence to support the 
Respondent's position. Significantly, the Respondent did 
not dispute Burr and Clark's marshaling of the evidence as 
to Finding No. 29. Second, the Respondent's evidence is 
utterly lacking because Ms. Haymond did not, in fact, 
analyze any factors that actually caused the pay discrepancy 
vis-a-vis Mr. Carlson beyond the March, 1994, ASI granted to 
him. R.232 (Transcript p. 195, lines 5-25 and p. 196, lines 
1-13). And, finally, the CSRB offers absolutely no 
justification for the pay discrepancy between Burr and Clark 
and Mr. Harr. 
n Q 
Ms. Haymond testified that the Special Adjustment 
granted to Carlson on March 29, 1994, caused Carlson to 
leapfrog in pay ahead of Grievants Burr and Clark. R.232 
(Transcript p.192). UDOC offered no other evidence 
identifying any specific factual justification or 
explanation why Messrs. Harr or Carlson are paid at a 
substantially higher rate than Burr and Clark. 
Although Ms. Haymond testified that different 
positions, hire dates, budgets, freeze years, performance 
evaluations, and career paths might potentially account for 
differences in pay between Burr, Clark, Carlson and Harr, 
she did not specifically identify any of those factors as 
the actual reasons for the pay disparity. R.232 (Transcript 
p. 190-195), a copy of the transcript pages is highlighted 
and attached hereto as a part of Exhibit A. 
Additionally, the CSRB's corrected finding wholly 
ignores Grievant's counsel's re-direct examination of Ms. 
Haymond regarding this issue wherein Ms. Haymond 
acknowledged that the formal documentation supporting Mr. 
Carlson's salary increase reflected that the same was, in 
20 
fact, an ASI and not due to his temporary duties. R.2 32 
(Transcript p.207-210). A highlighted copy of transcript 
pages 2 07-210 are included in the Addendum as a part of 
Exhibit A. The documentation also did not specify in what 
temporary capacity, if any, Mr. Carlson was allegedly 
performing or that there was any change in the duties of his 
position. R.232 (Transcript p. 210). Moreover, H.O. 
Valerga reviewed and had the benefit of Mr. Carlson's formal 
documentation from his personnel file. R.232 (Transcript p. 
210) and clearly made a credibility determination regarding 
the implausibility of Ms. Haymond's prior testimony due to 
her acknowledgment (on re-direct) that Mr. Carlson had, in 
fact, received an ASI without any justification. A true and 
correct copy of the document reviewed by H.O. Valerga 
concerning Mr. Carlson's ASI (R.581) is included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit B. The CSRB has therefore violated the 
"whole record" test in correcting Finding No. 2 9 and this 
Court should reverse the CSRB's decision because the 
Respondent did not carry its burden of presenting any 
justification for Mr. Carlson's and Mr. Harr's higher 
21 
compensation. 
II 
THE CSRB'S SPECULATIVE FINDING OF 
FACT REGARDING JUSTIFIABLE FACTORS IS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY RECORD EVIDENCE 
The CSRB, sub silentio, made a crucial, critical and 
new finding of fact that was not supported by any record 
testimony presented to the Step 5 Hearing Officer and 
thereby engaged in inappropriate speculation as to the 
UDOC's purported justification for compensating Grievants 
substantially less per hour than Messrs. Carlson and Harr. 
At page 14 of the CSRB's Decision, the CSRB cites 
"factors" from its Patel decision and then "finds" them to 
be present in the case at bar: 
"As stated best by the Board in 
Patel, variations in employees' 
individual salaries "result from such 
factors and conditions as promotions, 
career mobility assignments, varying 
amounts of merit money increases, 
legislatively-imposed Statewide salary 
freezes, cost of living adjustments 
(COLAs) which alter the State pay plans' 
entry rates (creating salary 
compression), length of service, long-
term leaves of absences, interrupted 
service and rehirings, reassignments, 
disciplinary penalties, and other job-
related factors.' (Patel at 9). 
nn 
The Board finds many of these 
factors present in the instant case. 
(Gvt. Ex.12; Agency Ex. 3) Moreover 
Appellants are clearly being paid within 
their salary range and have received the 
salary increases to which they are 
entitled. (Tr.II at 181-182, 191, 209-
210; Agency Ex. 1)." (Emphasis 
supplied). R.426. 
The CSRB's reliance on two (2) exhibits, unsupported by 
any record testimony explaining those exhibits, violates the 
residuum rule9 and constitutes nothing more than mere 
9. The residuum rule provides that: 
"Under the residuum rule, all hearsay and other 
legally inadmissible evidence admitted by an 
agency is set aside by the reviewing court. There 
must then remain some "residuum of legal evidence 
competent in a court of law," to support the 
agency's findings and conclusions of law. Yacht 
Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 
1226 (Utah 1984). If there is not a residuum of 
legally competent evidence remaining the agency 
action is reversed. Compare Sandy State Bank v. 
Brimhall, 636 P.2d 481, 486 (Utah 1981)(residuum 
found after hearsay evidence was set aside) with 
Williams v. Schwendimanf 740 P2d 1354, 1357 (Utah 
App. 1987) (no residuum found after inadmissible 
evidence was set aside). 
Although hearsay evidence is admissible at 
administrative hearings: 
"Hearsay evidence is admissible in proceedings 
before administrative agencies. Id. However, 
findings of fact cannot be based exclusively on 
hearsay evidence; they must be supported by a 
residuum of legal evidence competent in a court of 
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speculation on the part of the CSRB.10 Utah Pep't of 
Corrections v. Sucher, 796 P.2d 721, 723 (Utah App. Ct. 
1990) (Court of Appeals overruled Personnel Review Board's 
decision based, in part, on speculation by the Personnel 
Review Board). Simply stated, the CSRB's "finding" is not 
law." Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449, 450 
(Utah App.Ct. 1993), citing Yacht Club v. Utah 
Liquor Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 
1984) . 
10. It is the absence of any record testimony that would 
support the CSRB's interpretation of the exhibits in 
question that is such an egregious violation of the Residuum 
Rule. The exhibits in question are Grievants' (Burr and 
Clark's) Exhibit 12 and Agency's (UDOC's) Exhibit 3. Copies 
of Grievant's Exhibit 12 and Agency's Exhibit 3 are attached 
to the Addendum as a part of Exhibit C. R.2 76-2 85 
(Grievant's Exhibit 12), R.292-293 (Agency's Exhibit 3). 
Grievant's Exhibit 12 is a summary exhibit which 
demonstrates the pay inequity between Burr and Clark and 
Messer's Carlson and Harr. R.231 (Transcript p.104,109, 
128-130). Agency's Exhibit 3 constitutes Ms. Haymond's 
analysis of captain salaries. R.232 (Transcript p.168-169). 
However, the CSRB solely relied on the exhibits without any 
identification of any evidence that would support any 
specific factors justifying the pay inequity. The exhibits 
alone, constitute hearsay. Hoskins v. Industrial Comm'n of 
Utah, 918 P.2d 105, 158 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). While 
admissible at the administrative level, the administrative 
decision cannot be solely based on hearsay, but must be 
supported by a residuum of legally competent evidence. The 
CSRB plainly relied solely on the exhibits, which is a 
violation of the residuum rule. This violation of the 
residuum rule is prejudicial error because there is no 
evidence to support the CSRB's finding. 
based on any citation to testimony presented at the Step 5 
evidentiary hearing because no such testimony exists.11 The 
CSRB's "finding" is thus nothing more than uwishful 
thinking"12 and the same cannot underpin the CSRB's 
determination that UDOC had a bona fide justification for 
the pay discrepancies in question in this case because no 
such justification exists in the record testimony. 
Ill 
E.D. HAUNT'S DECISION CONSTITUTES 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The DHRM rule that was in effect at the time Burr and 
Clark filed their grievance provides that administrative 
salary increases (herein ASI) are justified for equity 
11. To the contrary, Ms. Haymond specifically testified 
that her general statements of "factors" that could, in the 
abstract, affect pay differences (i.e. salary freezes, 
performance evaluations, or hired at different rates) but 
admitted she did not do any analysis of any of these 
"factors" on the case at bar. R.232 (Transcript p. 190-192, 
195) . 
12. Ms. Haymond did testify that some of the duties of an 
SSIII require special training but there was no evidence 
presented by UDOC that Mr. Harr or Carlson had any special 
training that would justify their greater compensation 
levels. R.232 (Transcript p.197-198). 
o c 
issues, R477-7-4(11): 
(12) Administrative Salary Increase 
•The executive director or commissioner 
authorizes and approves Administrative Salary 
increases under the following parameters: 
(c) Justifications for Administrative Salary 
Increases shall be: 
(iv) Supported by issues such as: special 
agency conditions or problems, equity 
issues, or other unique situations or 
considerations in the agency." R477-7-
4(11) (c) (2000) (Emphasis supplied) . 
E.D. Haun acted arbitrarily and capriciously in at 
least two (2) ways when he denied the grievance of Burr and 
Clark.13 
First, E.D. Haun treated Burr and Clark inconsistently 
by denying their grievance but granting Mr. Brathwaite's 
seven (7) step salary increase.14 The Utah Administrative 
13. Statutory interpretations that are not agency specific 
are not given deference by the courts. Ferro v. Utah 
Department of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah App. 1992); 
Employers Reinsurance Fund v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
856 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah App. 1993). 
14. Once E.D. Haun decided to exercise his discretion to 
grant any ASI to any agency employee because of an internal 
pay inequity, E.D. Haun (in so doing) established an agency 
practice that such discretion will be exercised when pay 
inequity circumstances exist as to any Agency personnel. 
Simply stated, E.D. Haun cannot (consistent with merit 
Procedures Act provides for relief if: 
"(h) the agency action is: 
(v) an abuse of discretion 
delegated to the agency by 
statute; 
(vi) contrary to a rule of the 
agency; 
(vii) contrary to the agency's prior 
practice, unless the agency 
justifies the inconsistency 
by giving facts and reason 
that demonstrate a fair and 
rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(viii) otherwise arbitrary or 
capricious." (Emphasis 
supplied) . U.C.A. 63-46 (b)-
16(4) (h) (1988) . 
Significantly, E.D. Haun's final decision (R.288 
(Agency Exhibit 1)) did not distinguish Mr. Braithwaite's 
circumstance on classification grounds but rather was based 
on the claim that Grievants had not provided valid 
comparables.15 Remedying a statutory pay inequity as to one 
principles) grant an ASI to one employee so as to remedy a 
pay inequity and then deny another employee's request on the 
sole basis that he has discretion to do so under DHRM rules. 
Such a circumstance would be the essence of an arbitrary and 
capricious decision. 
15. Specifically, E.D. Haun claimed that comparing Burr and 
Clark to anyone other than Messrs. Liston and Carlson, who 
on 
classification but refusing to remedy a statutory pay 
inequity as to other employees based solely on the fact that 
the employees in question occupied different classifications 
is the essence of arbitrary and capricious decision making 
because it is nothing more than blatant favoritism.16 The 
Utah Court of Appeals in Pickett has provided guidance in 
were "titled" as Captains, was comparing "apples to oranges" 
from E.D. Haun's viewpoint. R.2 88 (Agency Exhibit 1, page 
1, paragraph 4). E.D. Haun's analysis is arbitrary and 
capricious because it is factually unsupported by the record 
evidence in this case. Specifically, E.D. Haun improperly 
examined only those comparables who had an "official 
Captain" title when issuing his Step 4 decision and did not 
appropriately consider time by Burr and Clark in the 
positions of IPC, SSIII and Captain. Comparison within 
these three (3) positions is appropriate and necessary based 
on the evidence presented at the Step 5 hearing 
demonstrating that the titles of IPC, SSIII and Captain 
constitute interchangeable positions and have been so 
treated by UDOC management have the same salary range, 
benchmark and level on organizational chart. E.D. Haun's 
conclusion that comparing the IPC, SSIII and Captain titles 
constitutes an "apples to oranges" analysis is thus 
factually unsupportable. 
16. Such a result is wholly inconsistent with the 
Legislature's requirement that the USPMA be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner that recognizes the "merit 
principles" of "equitable and competitive compensation." 
See, Section 67-19-3.1 (1) (b)&(2) . Moreover, Burr and Clark 
posit that the UDOC's "blatant favoritism" would likewise 
fall within the "catchall" provision contained in the 
Administrative Procedures Act wherein an agency action is 
reversible if "otherwise arbitrary and capricious." See, 
U.C.A. 63-46b-16(4) (h) (iv) . 
Ofi 
interpreting subsection 16(4) (h) (iii) : 
uWe agree with Justice Durham7 s 
analysis that this section requires 
a petitioner to establish as a prima 
facie case that the administrative 
agency's action in his or her case 
was 'contrary to the agency's prior 
practice,' If a petitioner meets 
this burden, section 16(4) (h) (iii) 
unambiguously requires that 'the 
agency justif[y] the inconsistency' 
with prior decisions. Therefore, as 
noted by Justice Durham, 
establishing a prima facie case by 
preponderance of the evidence shifts 
the burden to the agency to 
'demonstrate a fair and rational' 
basis for the departure from 
precedent in the instant case...." 
Pickett v. Utah Department of 
Commerce, 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah 
App. 1993). (Emphasis supplied). 
Grievants have the initial burden of establishing a 
prima facie case that they have been treated inconsistently. 
Grievants met their burden by demonstrating Mr. Brathwaite 
contemporaneously received17 a seven step ASI for "equity 
issues" at the same time Burr and Clark's claim was denied. 
R.231 (Transcript p.85-86, 88-89). Further evidence of 
UDOC's prior practice is demonstrated by E.D. Chabries and 
17. E.D. Chabries also testified that ASI's were given 
"across the board" to rectify external pay inequities for 
Captains in UDOC. R. 232 (Transcript p.215-216). 
O Q 
Ms. Haymond's testimony that the UDOC has addressed pay 
inequity issues in the past - both internal inequities 
(i.e., within UDOC - Mr. Braithwaite) and external 
inequities (i.e., pay raises based on comparisons to other 
governmental entities) R.232 (Transcript p.215-216, 88-89). 
Grievants further met their burden by comparing themselves 
to fellow employees Messrs. Carlson and Harr. It is 
uncontroverted that Messrs. Carlson and Harr are proper 
comparables who receive substantially more compensation then 
Burr and Clark. As a result, the burden shifted to UDOC to 
demonstrate a "fair and rational" basis for UDOC's 
inconsistent with prior practice treatment of Grievants.18 
18. The H.O. erroneously held that UAPA does not apply at 
the Step 4 level. The Utah Court of Appeals in Lunnen v. 
Utah Dept. of Transportation, 886 P.2d 70 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995)(cert, denied) held that (as to disciplinary actions) 
the Step 4 decisions must be consistently applied. Although 
Lunnen involved discipline, and Burr and Clark's claim is a 
pay inequity case, Burr and Clark are unaware of any 
statutory provisions in UAPA or the Grievance and Appeals 
Statutes that permit different due process standards be 
applied to grievances initiated by an employee rather then 
an Agency. Inasmuch as Lunnen was predicated on 
constitutional due process standards, Burr and Clark submit 
Lunnen persuasively applies to the case at bar on this 
issue. 
UDOC presented no specific evidence explaining why Grievants 
were treated inconsistently with either Brathwaite or 
Carlson and Harr. UDOC action is thus inconsistent with 
prior practice and arbitrary and capricious.19 
E.D. Haun further acted arbitrarily and capriciously by 
performing an incomplete comparison in his final order. 
E.D. Haun's comparison is incomplete in two (2) ways. 
First, at no point in his final order did E.D. Haun 
compare Petitioner Burr to Carlson despite admitting that 
Grievants were comparable to Carlson: 
"With all the people of whom Mr. 
Burr and Mr. Clark sought to compare 
themselves, only two were classified 
as captains during the times 
relevant to these grievances, Liston 
and Will Carlson. Any other 
comparison is apples to oranges." 
R.288-289 (Agency Exhibit 1). 
Second, E.D. Haun's comparison was incomplete in that 
he excluded the comparables of those Captains holding the 
position of IPC and SSIII (i.e. Harr). Grievants have 
19. The arbitrary and capricious standard also applies 
under CSRB Rule 137-1-21(3). 
demonstrated in the Step 5 Hearing that the positions of 
IPC, SSIII and Captain are all interchangeable, all in the 
same salary range and all have the same level of supervisory 
duties.20 Further, E.D. Haun thus acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in failing to award Grievants their requested 
remedy.21 
20. At Burr and Clark's request and after briefing the 
issue, the CSRB overruled the H.O. and determined that the 
position of IPC, SSIII and Captain are all interchangeable. 
R.424-425 (fn.18). 
21. Further, Clark testified that: 
"A. (BY LOWELL CLARK) No, it was a 
meeting with Mr. Haun. 
Q. (BY MR. DYER) And why don't you 
describe for us what happened during the 
meeting with Mr. Haun. 
A. During the meeting he wanted to know 
our issues of the grievance that we had 
filed and why we felt like we had some 
action coming in that. During the course 
of the grievance we discussed other 
occurrences that we felt justified 
something to be done for us. Mr. Haun 
invited us to take this issue to court. 
It was his feeling - that was projected 
to me anyway - it was his feeling that 
the legislature or whoever give him his 
authority had given him the 
responsibility to do ASI's to maintain 
equity, but they did not give him the 
money to do that, and he was desirous of 
somebody taking it someplace where they 
22 
IV 
THE CSRB ERRONEOUSLY DETERMINED THAT DHRM IS 
SOLELY RESPONSIBLE TO REMEDY PAY INEQUITIES 
The Attorney General's Office has taken inconsistent 
positions before the CSRB concerning whether the USPMA 
applies only to State agencies or DHRM.22 
would be forced to give that money. 
Q. So you understood Mr. Haun telling 
you to go ahead and appeal it because 
that way he -would be forced to do it. 
A. Yes." R. 231 (Transcript p. 134) A 
copy of which is highlighted and included 
in the addendum as a part of Exhibit A. 
Nonetheless, any potential lack of funding was not a 
defense raised by UDOC at the Step 5 Hearing. R.232 
(Transcript p.225). 
22. In Draughon v. Dept. of Fin. Instit., 975 P.2d 935, 
938-39 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999), the Utah Court of Appeals' 
reliance on Lewis Carroll is both poignant and pertinent to 
the matter at bar, to-wit: 
uWe agree with the appellant's 
counsel that Human Resource's rules 
distinguishing between a demotion and 
an involuntary reassignment are 
comparable to a memorable exchange 
between Alice and Humpty Dumpty: 
"'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty 
said in a rather scornful tone, xit 
means just what I choose it to mean--
nothing more nor less.' vThe 
question is,' said Alice, 'whether 
you can make word mean different 
things.' xThe question is,' said 
Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be 
master--that' s all.'" Lewis Carroll, 
^ 
In contrast to the Department of Health's position in 
the case cited in footnote 22 the UDOC took a contradictory 
position, to-wit: the USPMA' s reference to "department" 
applies only to DHRM and not the UDOC. Grievants submit the 
Attorney General office's "new" interpretation is wrong for 
several reasons. 
First, E.D. Chabries testified that UDOC's ALJ, Spencer 
Robinson, requested a declaratory order from Ms. Okabe 
regarding DHRM's interpretation in regards to this case, but 
Through the Looking Glass and What 
Alice Found There 123 (1941). Id. 
Much like Humpty Dumpty, the Attorney General's Office 
must believe it is the umaster" of the USPMA. For example, 
in Melody Staples v. Utah Department of Health, 
19CSRB/H.0.275 [rev'd on other grounds 8 CSRB 71 (Step 6, 
2004)), Burr and Clark's counsel argued that the USPMA 
statutorily defined "department" to refer to DHRM and 
therefore the USPMA statutory provisions regarding 
termination of a career service employee required Ms. Karen 
Suzuki-Okabe (as "head" of the "department" - i.e. DHRM) to 
conduct all Step 4 Loudermill hearings under Section 67-19-
18(5)(a-e) of the USPMA. H.O. Guyon rejected Burr and 
Clark's counsel's argument and instead accepted Deputy A.G. 
Laurie Noda's argument that the phrase "department head" 
essentially means the same as "agency head." A copy of ALJ 
Guyon's decision is included in the Addendum as Exhibit D. 
Copies of Burr and Clark's counsel's brief in the Staples 
matter and Ms. Noda's Reply Brief in the Staples matter were 
previously attached to Grievants' Posthearing Reply Brief as 
exhibit A thereto. R.355-394. 
then the request was withdrawn because this matter was one 
to be addressed by UDOC's E.D. not DHRM. R.232 (Transcript 
p. 228-231), highlighted and included in the Addendum as a 
part of Exhibit A. Ms. Haymond further testified that ASI's 
are within "the sole discretion of the executive director of 
each agency of commissioner." R.232 (Transcript p.204-205) 
highlighted and included in the Addendum as a part of 
Exhibit A. 
Second, the UDOC's argument ignores the fact that all 
Utah state agencies (including the UDOC) are required to 
comply with the USPMA. Third, the UDOC (not DHRM) is 
factually responsible for the pay inequity circumstance in 
the case at bar because it (not DHRM) granted Carlson and 
Harr "special adjustment/pay increase" without supporting 
justification whatsoever for this ufair-haired son" 
preferential treatment.23 And lastly, the UDOC has failed 
23. The UDOC's failure to dispute that portion of Burr and 
Clark's Posthearing Brief concerning the facts is 
particularly on point in this context. Specifically, 
paragraph 38, at page 10 of Burr and Clark's Posthearing 
Brief, Burr and Clark maintain: 
u3 8. Grievants submit that the Agency 
to identify any legitimate business reasons that would 
support the pay inequity circumstances when comparing 
Grievants and Carlson and Harr.24 
offered no specific evidence identifying 
any specific factual justification or 
explanation why Harr or Carlson are paid 
at a higher rate than Burr or Clark." 
R.311. 
The UDOC did not challenge paragraph 3 8 in its Reply 
nor did it present any evidence that DHRM was exclusively 
responsible for the pay inequity circumstance demonstrated 
by the record evidence in this case. Ostensibly, the UDOC 
presented no such evidence because (in the worst case 
scenario) it does not exist or (in the best case scenario) 
the UDOC affirmatively created the pay inequity circumstance 
herein and DHRM merely "blessed" the UDOC's actions in 
performance of its ministerial functions. 
24. Significantly, the CSRB and UDOC ignore the fact that 
pay inequities without legitimate business reasons 
implicitly must be remedied. See, F. Donald B. Campbell, et 
al. v. Utah Department of Human Resource Management, 
12CSRB/H.0.170(1994)("there is not law or rule that requires 
employees to receive the same salaries or salary increases 
if the differences are reached upon legitimate business 
reasons.")(Emphasis supplied). Significantly, the UDOC 
cited the foregoing quote from Campbell "verbatim" in its 
Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss date 
June 15, 2001, and which is contained on file in this 
matter. 
V 
INEQUITABLE APPLICATION OF THE 
CAPTAIN LEVEL SALARY RANGE AND 
COMPENSATION ENTITLES GRIEVANTS TO 
PREVAIL ON THEIR GRIEVANCE 
A, Burr and Clark Are Entitled To Their 4 Step Salary 
Increase Based On Their Statutory Right Under The USPMA To 
Equal Pay For Equal Work, Equitable Application Of Their 
Salary Range And Equitable And Competitive Compensation. 
Grievants have a statutory right under the provisions 
of the USPMA to be compensated equally and equitably. 
Specifically, in U.C.A. 67-19-12(3) (a), the Legislature has 
mandated that every career service employee is entitled to 
equal pay for equal work: 
u(3)(a) The director shall25 prepare, 
maintain, and revise a position classification 
plan for each employee position not exempted 
under Subsection (2) to provide equal pay for 
equal work." Utah Code Annotated 67-19-
12(3) (a) (1997) (Emphasis supplied) . 
Second, in U.C.A. 67-19-12(3) (b), the Legislature has 
mandated that each career service employee is entitled to 
25. It cannot be disputed that the Legislature's use of the 
word "shall" constitutes a mandatory obligation on state 
agencies under the USPMA. Significantly, UDOC has not 
identified any DHRM rule that implements or interprets the 
USPMA provisions in question. Ostensibly, UDOC's omission 
is not their fault because none appear to exist. 
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have his/her salary range applied equitably to him/her: 26 
"(3)(b) Classification of positions shall27 be 
based upon similarity of duties performed and 
responsibilities assumed, so that the same job 
requirements and the same salary range may be 
applied equitably to each position in the same 
class." Utah Code Annotated 67-19-
12(3) (b) (1997) (Emphasis supplied) . 
Third, inU.C.A. 67-19-3.1 (1) (b) , the Legislature 
mandated the career service must provide for equitable 
compensation: 
67-19-3.1. Principles governing 
interpretation of chapter and adoption of 
rules. 
(1) The department shall28 establish a career 
service system designed in a manner that will 
provide for the effective implementation of 
the following merit principles: 
(b) providing for equitable and competitive 
compensation." Utah Code Annotated 67-19-
3.1(1) (b) (2000) (Emphasis supplied) . 
26. Under the USPMA, DHRM is responsible for establishing 
the salary range and establishment of the same is not 
grievable under U.C.A. 67-19-12(4)(ix). Individual and, 
hence, equitable application of the salary range to any 
person (i.e. Burr and Clark) is, however, an agency 
function, responsibility and obligation under U.C.A. 67-19-
9(2) . 
27. See, footnote 25 hereinabove. 
28. Id. 
Under these three (3) provisions in the USPMA, the 
Legislature has unequivocally created a right in career 
service employees (including Burr and Clark) to equal pay 
for equal work; equitable application of Burr and Clark's 
salary range based on an equal pay for equal work premise; 
and that Burr and Clark receive equitable and competitive 
compensation. Once Burr and Clark established violation of 
the foregoing statutes, they need not prove a violation of 
DHRM rules because "rules are subordinate to statutes and 
cannot confer greater rights or disabilities." Morgan Co. 
v. Holnam, 29 P.3d 629, 631 (Utah 2001). UDOC also 
misinterprets the law when it argues that the absence of 
agency rules vitiates Grievants' rights created and 
protected under the USPMA.29 
29. The CSRB relies on three (3) cases (Pitkin, Lund and 
Patel) for the proposition that "equity alone is not 
enough." Burr and Clark's claim that there has been an 
inequitable application of their salary range, an arbitrary 
and capricious action by the Executive Director in denying 
their grievance, and that they have been financially harmed 
by receiving less pay than they are entitled to receive. 
Burr and Clark rely on three (3) statutes, and do not rely 
on 'equity' per se. 
In Patel, the CSRB denied Mr. Patel any relief because 
*2 Q 
he was an Engineer IV and his comparable was an Engineer 
III. The CSRB acknowledged, however, that the uequal pay 
for equal work" statutory provision in the USPMA xx insures" 
that the equal pay concept applies within job 
classifications, to-wit: 
uThe pay range should reflect equal pay 
for equal work. (See UCA 67-19-12(4)) 
The concept of equal pay for equal 
work is confined to employees within 
the same classification. Equal pay is 
not, as Mr. Patel argues, a generic 
concept comparing duties in different 
classifications. Mr. Patel is insured 
[of] equal pay for equal work within 
his classification." (Highlighted 
emphasis in original.) Patel v. 
Division of Environmental Health, 4 
CSRB 3 7 (Underline emphasis supplied). 
Since Burr and Clark are, for the purpose of this case, 
within the same classification that is encompassed by the 
"titles" denominated as "IPC," "SSIII" and "Captain," Burr 
and Clark assert the Patel decision supports Burr and 
Clark's statutory interpretation/argument in this case. 
Pitkin involved a classification issue, wherein the 
Hearing Officer concluded that the job duties and 
responsibilities were the same, and awarded compensation 
adjustment from the date of the grievance. Not only did the 
Burr and Clark in that case prevail, but the Hearing Officer 
further provided that, uthe facts and circumstances of this 
particular appeal are such that that little, if any, 
precedence would apply to other non-related cases." 
Division of Env'l Health v. Pitkin, 2 PRB 15, 11 (Step 6) 
(1984). Pitkin involved no statute. 
Lund involved a discretionary Personnel Management Rule 
from 1985 that provided: 
"A one or two step increase may be 
granted to employees who successfully 
CONCLUSION 
Burr and Clark respectfully request this Court reverse 
the CSRB's Decision and order the UDOC to grant Burr and 
Clark a four (4) step pay increase, retroactive to the date 
of the initial filing of their grievance on May 28, 1998. 
DATED this ^ day of ^ U L , 2004. 
Respectfully submitted, 
(W, S-\*. 
PhillipJW. D^er, Esq. 
Carey A. Seager, Esq. 
Attorneys for Grievants 
MI/E /client/UPEA/UGOP/Burr and Clark/Appeal Brief (Court of Appeals) 
complete six months of probation." Lund 
v. Division of Health Care Financing, 3 
PRB 24, at page 6 (Step 6, 1997) 
(Emphasis supplied). 
The PRB Board determined that the use of the word "may" 
and the absence of a statute made the rule discretionary. 
This is distinguished from Burr and Clark's case because 
UDOC violated the USPMA. 
So even if there existed an agency rule implementing the 
three (3) statutes hereinabove quoted, no agency rule could 
limit the rights provided by the USPMA and UDOC's decision 
will not be afforded deference. See, Draughon v. Dept. of 
Financial Institutions, 975 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah App. 1999). 
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